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Wellie on remounts...
To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.
< MY LORD, ' Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.
' I think it proper to draw your Lordship's attention at this early period to the state of the cavalry horses in Portugal; and I enclose a paper, containing an account of the number deficient at the present moment, and of the number unserviceable in each regiment. The deficiencies in the 3d dragoon guards are stated to have been occasioned by the want of forty horses to complete it, when that corps was sent from England, and by the loss of a transport, containing twenty six horses, run down by one of His Majesty's ships on the passage ; those in the 14th light dragoons, by the ordinary casualties of the service, and by glanders caught in the transports in which they came from England.
' Your Lordship will observe that the 14th light dragoons have cast no horses for fourteen months, and they have now sixty four horses unserviceable.
' As it is of the utmost importance to keep up the cavalry to its full numbers, and as no horses can be procured in Portugal, I take the liberty of recommending that a remount for each of the regiments, to the amount stated in the enclosed paper, may be sent from England at an early period.
' In case your Lordship should think proper to attend to this recommendation, I further beg leave to recommend that the horses sent may not be those collected at the depots of the regiments respectively, which I understand are generally too young for immediate service ; but horses either drafted or purchased for the purpose, and of the description and in the condition to perform the services which will be immediately required of them.
' I have the honor to be, &c.
' Viscount Castlereagh: ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY
To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of Slate.
' MY DEAR LORD, ' Abrantes, 22d June, 1809.
< When I wrote you last I was in hopes that I should have marched before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The French are continuing their retreat ; Sebastiani has also fallen back towards Toledo ; and Venegas has advanced, and Cuesta had his head quarters at Truxillo on the 19th.
' I am apprehensive that you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily since my arrival upon the Tagus. But it was and is quite impossible to move without money. Not only were the Officers and soldiers in the greatest distress, and the want of money the cause of many of the disorders of which I have had reason to complain ; but we can no longer obtain the supplies of the country, or command its resources for the transport of our own supplies, either by land or by water. Besides this, the army required rest after their expedition to the frontiers of Galicia, and shoes,, and to be furbished up in different ways ; and I was well aware that if necessity had not obliged me to halt at the present , moment, I should have been compelled to have made a longer halt some time hence. To all this add, that, for some time after I came here, I believed the French were retiring (as appears by my letters to your Lordship), and that I should have had no opportunity of striking a blow against them, even if I could have marched.
* I hope that you will attend to my requisitions for money ; not only am I in want, but also the Portuguese Government, to whom, Mr. Villiers says, we owe 125,000/. I repeat that we must have 200,000/. per month from England, till I write to you that I can do without it; in which sum I include 40,000/. per month for the Portuguese Government to pay for 20,000 men.
f If the Portuguese Government are to receive a larger sum from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to pay the Portuguese debts and our debts in Portugal. There are, besides, debts of Sir John Moore's army still due in Spain, which I am called upon to pay. In short, we must have 125,000/. ; and 200,000/. per month, reckoning from the beginning of May.
' It is very extraordinary that I have not received a line from Huskisson upon this subject, notwithstanding that I wrote to him upon it early in May.
f Believe me, &c.
' Viscount Castlereagh. ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
' P. S. I hope you will send the remount horses soon. I have given to the 14th and 16th ninety five horses from the Irish Commissariat, and I believe I shall give some to the other regiments. This arrangement, and the draft from the 3d hussars, will keep up the regiments for a short time. But it is inconceivable how fast both the horses of the cavalry and artillery fall off. When horses, as well as men, are new in war, I believe the former are generally the sacrifice of their mutual inexperience. I hope we shall profit by the experience acquired in the expedition to the northward, and that we shall be able to keep up the regiments rather better in future. ' A. W.'
To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.
' MY DEAR LORD, ' Abrantes, 27th June, 1809.
1 The money for which I have been waiting arrived here on Sunday, and the army has marched forward. Our advanced guard will enter Spain at Zarza la Mayor, on the 2d of July.
' The French retired from Almaraz on the road towards Madrid on the 24th. And General Cuesta was at the bridge of Almaraz on the same day, and was making arrangements to cross the Tagus.
* Sebastiani was retiring towards Toledo. He was on the 22d at Madridejos, and Venegas at Villarta.
' It is unfortunate that I could not march ten or twelve days ago; but just to show you the uncertainty of all communications in this country, and probably the deficiencies ,of our Commissariat, I shall mention that the money which arrived on the 15th at Lisbon, and was sent off' immediately, did not arrive here till late on the 25th. It is the same with everything else. On the day I determined to move into Spain from Abrantes I ordered everything that could be required for the army, and I have not had occasion
-to i add to or to alter the original order ; yet the articles ordered are not yet arrived, notwithstanding that there is a water communication from Lisbon, and Officers and others come up in five days.
' I believe much of this delay and failure is to be attributed to the want of experience of our Commissariat ; much to the want of money, and to our discredit in Portugal, on account of our large and long owed debts ; and something to the uncertainty and natural difficulties of all the com-munications in Portugal.
' We shall not go into Spain quite so strong as I could wish ; but when Craufurd's brigade arrives I think we shall have nearly 20,000 rank and file of infantry, and about 3000 cavalry. I shall desire that a weekly state may be sent to your Lordship, that you may see how we really stand; for I observe it is frequently imagined in England that armies are much stronger than they really are, and expectations are formed which cannot be realized. It is a most difficult task to keep up numbers, particularly of cavalry, in this country and climate. The brigade of heavy cavalry, which has not yet done a day's duty, is obliged to leave here nearly 100 horses ; and the brigade which has been to the northward is so much reduced, that they are happy to take 110 horses of the Irish Commissariat. I hope, therefore, you will send us the remount as soon as you can.
' Believe me, &c.
' Viscount Castlereagh.' ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY,
To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.
' SIR, ' Jaraicejo, 13th August, 1809.
( I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the llth.
' The plan which your Excellency proposes of placing all the supplies in a magazine, to be formed at Truxillo, and to divide them between the two armies in proportion to the strength of each, would answer perfectly if it were practicable. But your Excellency must be aware that many articles of provisions are received by your Excellency's army which do not pass through Truxillo, and could not be brought there without great inconvenience and delay, and could never appear in the accounts of the magazines ; and that other supplies could easily be turned oiF from Truxilio without my having any knowledge of the fact.
' The British army receive no provisions of which Sr. Lozano de Torres has not a knowledge ; and your Excellency has it in your power to give him such orders as you may think proper, both as to the formation of the magazine, and the share which the British troops shall have of it.
< When the British army entered Spain I had reason to expect, and I expected, that a great effort would be made to afford us subsistence, at least for payment, and those means of transport and other aids, without which your Excellency is well aware no army can keep the field.
' Your Excellency also knows how these expectations have been fulfilled. Since I joined your army the troops have not received, upon an average, half a ration, and on some days nothing at all; and the cavalry no forage or grain, excepting what they could pick up in the fields, of an unwholesome description, by the use of which hundreds of horses have died.
' I can procure no means of transport, and your Excellency knows that I have been obliged to leave some ammunition in the mountains, of which you have possession ; and if I now move, I must leave behind me two thirds of the small quantity of ammunition I have got, having been obliged to allot the Portuguese carts, which have moved it hitherto, to the purpose of removing the wounded soldiers.
' The fire of the enemy, and the badness and scarcity of food, have destroyed many of my artillery horses ; and I have asked, but in vain, for some assistance of this description. The consequence is that I shall be obliged to destroy many guns when I shall move from hence.
< I have not received even an answer to the request I made to have a remount for the cavalry of only 100 mares, which would be entirely useless to the Spanish cavalry.
' Under all these circumstances, your Excellency cannot be surprised that I should think that the British army has been neglected and ill treated ; or at the determination which I now communicate to you, that whatever maybe the consequences to the valuable interests to which you refer in your letter, I shall march them back into Portugal, if they are not more regularly and more plentifully supplied with pro-
visions and forage, and with the means of transport, and other aids which they require.
' I have to observe, that whether I put this determination into execution or not, the evil consequences that you apprehend to the valuable interests to which you refer, must equally follow ; as the army will be unable and unfit to perform any operation, if the privations which it has suffered are still to continue.
' I request your Excellency to give orders to the troops you have sent to Truxillo not to prevent the officers and soldiers of the British army from buying what they want there. The troops have had no salt or other necessary articles for some time, and it is desirable that they and their officers should be allowed to buy at Truxillo what that place can afford.
' I have the honor to be, &c.
' Captain General < ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUT. COLONEL WATERS.
* Jaraicejo, 14th August, 1809.
' 1. The number of rations required daily by the British army is now 25,000 for men, and 6000 for horses, &c.
( 2. It appears to me that it will be difficult to settle any plan by which the contents of any magazine could be issued to the two armies in proportion to their numbers, because both armies may, and the Spanish army certainly does, draw provisions and forage from some quarters besides the maga-
zine which is formed at Truxillo. The British army now get their bread only from Truxillo ; therefore, any arrangement which should throw all the bread baked at, or which, may be brought to Truxillo, into a magazine to be divided in proportions between the two armies, would be unjust towards the British, and would probably starve it.
' 3. If, however, any arrangement can be adopted by which this difficulty can be got over, I shall have no objection to it in respect to bread; and no objection whatever in respect to barley.
1 4. In respect to meat, as that is to be got in all parts of the country, it would be best to leave the supply as it is, in the hands of the Commissaries of the different nations.
' 5. At least 1000 beasts of burthen are required for the British army.
' 6. 100 carts, each to carry 600 Ibs., are required to carry the ammunition left at Deleytosa.
' 7. 100 good draught mules or horses are required to draw the British artillery.
' 8. 300 mares are required to remount the British cavalry.
' 9. Payment will be made on the spot for such of these animals as shall be purchased, and the regular and usual hire paid for those which shall be hired.
' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'
To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.
< MY DEAR LORD, . Merida, 25th August, 1809. '
' I received by Mr. Hay, on the day before yesterday, your letter of the 4th August, and having for some time past turned my mind very seriously to the consideration of the points to which it relates, I am not unprepared to give you an opinion upon them.
1 The information which I have acquired in the last two months has opened my eyes respecting the state of the war in the Peninsula ; and I shall just state a few facts which will enable the King's ministers to form their own opinions upon it.
' I calculate the French force in the Peninsula now to consist of about 125,000 men : of this number, about 70,000 are in this part of Spain ; St. Cyr's corps, about 20,000 men, are engaged in the siege of Gerona ; Suchet's, about 14,000, in Aragon; and the remainder are employed in different garrisons, such as Avila, &c., and in keeping up the communication with France: all of which, if necessary, are disposable for the field. These 125,000 men are exclusive of the garrisons of Pamplona, Barcelona, &c. &c.
c These troops, you will observe, are all in Spain ; and against this force the Spaniards have, under Venegas and Eguia, late Cuesta's army, about 50,000 men ; Romana, the Duque del Parque, and every thing to the northward, about 25,000 ; Blake may have gotten together again about 5000 or 6000 ; and I believe there is nothing in Aragon and Catalonia, excepting an armed population.
f Thus, 'the Spaniards have not, at the end of eighteen months nearly, after the commencement of the revolution, above 80,000 men, of which the composition and quality will be found still more defective than the numbers are deficient to carry on the contest with the French even in their present strength.
' To these numbers add all the troops we can bring into the field at present, which are about 25,000 men, and about 10,000 Portuguese, and you will see that the allies are at this moment inferior in point of numbers only to the enemy in the Peninsula. However, in this account of the troops of the allies, Ido not reckon many garrisons and towns occupied by both Spaniards and Portuguese ; nor do I reckon the French garrisons. I count only those men on both sides who can be brought into the field to fight.
' In respect to the composition of these armies, we find the French well supplied with troops of the different descriptions and arms required : viz., infantry, artillery, and cavalry, heavy and light.
* Cuesta's army had about 7000 cavalry, Venegas' about 3000, and there may be about 2000 more cavalry distributed throughout Spain,
1 The English have about 2500 cavalry left, and the Portuguese army may have 500 or 600. Probably, if all this cavalry were efficient, and could be divided as it ought to be, it might be sufficient, and might be found more numerous than that of the French in the Peninsula : but you will observe that all the cavalry is now in the south, and Romana's army (which it is most important to bring forward, as unless
it is brought forward the allies can never make any impression on the French to the southward) has neither cavalry nor artillery, and cannot quit the mountains; neither has the Duque del Parque more than one regiment, or Blake more than the same number.
' I come now to the description of the troops, and here I am sorry to say that our allies fail us still more than they do in numbers and composition.
* The Spanish cavalry are, I believe, nearly entirely with out discipline. They are in general well clothed, armed, and accoutred, and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good condition ; I mean those of Eguia's army, which I have seen. But I have never heard any body pretend that in any one instance they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in presence of an enemy. They make no scruple of running off, and after an action are to be found in every village, and every shady bottom within fifty miles of the field of battle.
' The Spanish artillery are, as far as I have seen of them, entirely unexceptionable, and the Portuguese artillery excellent.
' In respect to the great body of all armies, I mean the infantry, it is lamentable to see how bad that of the Spaniards is, and how unequal to a contest with the French. They are armed, I believe, well ; they are badly accoutred, not having the means of saving their ammunition from the rain ; not clothed in some instances at all, in others clothed in such a manner as to make them look like peasants, which
ought of all things to be avoided ; and their discipline appears to me to be confined to placing them in the ranks, three deep at very close order, and to the manual exercise.
( It is impossible to calculate upon any operation with these troops. It is said that sometimes they behave well ; though I acknowledge that I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill. Bassecourt's corps, which was supposed to be the best in Cuesta s army, and was engaged on our left in the mountains, at the battle of Talavera, was kept in check throughout the day by one French battalion : this corps has since run away from the bridge of Arzobispo, leaving its guns ; and many of the men,, according to the usual Spanish custom, throwing away their arms, accoutrements, and clothing. It is a curious circumstance respecting this affair at Arzobispo, (in which Soult writes that the French took thirty pieces of cannon,) that the Spaniards ran off in such a hurry, that they left their cannon loaded and unspiked; and that the French, although they drove the Spaniards from the bridge, did not think themselves strong enough to push after them ; and Colonel Waters, whom I sent in with a flag of truce on the 10th, relating to our wounded, found the cannon on the road, abandoned by the one party, and not taken possession of, and probably not known of, by the other.
' This practice of running away, and throwing off arms, accoutrements, and clothing, is fatal to every thing, excepting a re-assembly of the men in a state of nature, who as regularly perform the same manoeuvre the next time an occasion offers. Nearly 2000 ran off on the evening of the 27th from the battle of Talavera, (not 100 yards from the place where I was standing,) who were neither attacked, nor threatened with an attack, and who were frightened only by the noise of their own fire : they left their arms and accoutrements on the ground, their officers went with them; and they, and the fugitive cavalry, plundered the baggage of the British army which had been sent to the rear. Many others went whom I did not see.
' Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army ; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has, by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should be so little understood. They are really children in the art of war, and I cannot say that they do any thing as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state of nature.
' I really believe that much of this deficiency of numbers, composition, discipline, and efficiency, is to be attributed to the existing government of Spain. They have attempted to govern the kingdom in a state of revolution, by an adherence to old rules and systems, and with the aid of what is called enthusiasm ; and this last is, in fact, no aid to accomplish any thing, and is only an excuse for the irregularity with which every thing is done, and for the want of discipline and subordination of the armies.
' People are very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French through their revolution, and was the parent of those exertions which have nearly conquered the world ; but if the subject is nicely examined, it will be found that enthusiasm was the name only, but that force was the instrument which brought forward those great resources under the system of terror which first stopped the allies ; and that a perseverance in the same system of applying every individual and every description of property to the servjce of the army, by force, has since conquered Europe.
' After this statement, you will judge for yourselves, whether you will employ any, and what strength of army in support of the cause in Spain.
' Circumstances with which you are acquainted have obliged me to separate myself from the Spanish army, and I can only tell you that I feel no inclination to join in co-operation with them again, upon my own responsibility : and that I shall see my way very clearly before me indeed, before I do so ; and I do not recommend you to have any thing to do with them in their present state.
' Before I quit this part of the subject, it may be satisfactory to you to know that I do not think matters would have been much better if you had sent your large expedition to Spain, instead of to the Scheldt. You could not have equipped it in Galicia, or any where in the north of Spain.
< If we had had 60,000 men instead of 20,000, in all probability we should not have got to Talavera to fight the battle, for want of means and provisions. But if we had got to Talavera, we could not have gone farther, and the armies would probably have separated for want of means of subsistence, probably without a battle ; but certainly afterwards.
' Besides, you will observe that your 40,000 men, supposing them to be equipped and means to exist of feeding them, would not compensate for the deficiency of numbers, of composition, and of efficiency in the Spanish armies ; and that supposing they had been able to remove the French from Madrid,they could not have removed them from the Peninsula, even in the existing state of the French force.
' I now come to another branch of the subject, which is Portugal itself. I have not got from Beresford his report upon the present, and the probable future state of the Portuguese army ; and therefore I should wish to be understood as writing, upon this part of the subject, liable to corrections from him.
' My opinion is, and always has been, that the mode of applying the services of the English officers to the Portuguese army has been erroneous. I think that Beresford ought to have had the temporary assistance of the ablest officers the British service could afford; that these officers ought not to have been posted to regiments in the Portuguese army, but under the title of Adjutants to the Field Marshal, or any other, they ought to have superintended discipline, military movements, and arrangements of all descriptions, wherever they might be : fewer officers would then have answered his purpose, and every one given to him would have been useful ; whereas many (all in the inferior ranks) are, under existing arrangements, useless.
' Besides this, the selection of officers sent out to Portugal for this service has been unlucky, and the decision on the questions which I sent to England on the 7th of June, has been made without reference to circumstances, or to the feelings or opinions of the individuals on whom it was to operate; and just like every other decision I have ever seen from the same quarter, as if men were stocks and
stones.
( To this, add that rank (Portuguese rank, I mean) has been given in the most capricious manner. In some instances, a man not in the army at all is made a Brigadier General ; in others, another who was the senior of the Brigadier General when both were in the army, is a Lieut. Colonel; then a junior Lieut. Colonel is made a Brigadier General, his senior a Colonel, and his senior a junior Colonel ; and thereare instances of juniors being preferred to seniors in every rank ; in short, the Prince Regent of Portugal is a despotic prince, and his commissions have been given to British Officers and subjects in the most arbitrary manner at the Horse Guards ; and the answer to all these complaints at the Horse Guards must be uniform, nobody has any right to complain ; the Prince Kegent has a right to
give to any body any commission he pleases, bearing any date he chooses to assign to it. The officers of this army have to a man quitted the Portuguese service, as I said they would, and there is not an officer who has joined it from England who would not quit it if we would allow him ; but here we keep them : so much for that arrangement.
' The subject upon which particularly I wished Beresford to report, was the state of the Portuguese army in respect to its numbers. The troops have lately deserted to an alarming degree ; and, in fact, none of the regiments are complete. The Portuguese army is recruited by conscription constitutionally, very much in the same manner with the French army ; but then it must be recollected, that, for the last fifty years nearly, the troops have never left their province, and scarcely ever their native town ; and their discipline, and the labors and exertion required from them, were nothing.
' Things are much altered lately, and notwithstanding that the pay has been increased, I fear that the animal is not of the description to bear up against what is required of him ; and he deserts most terribly.
' The military forces stationed in the provinces enabled the civil government to carry into execution the conscription ; but under present circumstances, the military force is upon principle, as well as necessity, removed to a distance. The civil government has been so frequently overthrown in all parts of Portugal, that it can hardly be said to exist ; and there is another circumstance which I am afraid cramps its operations, particularly those operations which are to put a restraint upon the people, and that is, that they are all armed, and they defy the civil magistrate and the government who order them to march as conscripts, whose authority is unsupported by a sufficient military force : I am therefore very apprehensive that Beresford will find it impossible to fill his ranks : however, as I said before, I should wish Government to delay making their minds up on this part of the subject till I shall be enabled to send them Beresford's report, for which I have called.
' The next point in this subject is, supposing the Portuguese army to be rendered efficient, what can be done with it and Portugal, if the French should obtain possession of the remainder of the Peninsula ? My opinion is, that we ought to be able to hold Portugal, if the Portuguese army and militia are complete.
* The difficulty upon this sole question lies in the embarkation of the British army. There are so many entrances into Portugal, the whole country being frontier, that it would be very difficult to prevent the enemy from penetrating; and it is probable that we should be obliged to confine ourselves to the preservation of that which is most important the capital.
< It is difficult, if not impossible,-to bring the contest for the capital to extremities, and afterwards to embark the British army. You will see what I mean, by a reference to the map. Lisbon is so high up the Tagus that no army that we could collect would be able at the same time to secure the navigation of the river by the occupation of both banks, and the possession of the capital. One of the objects must, I fear, be given up, and that which the Portuguese would give up would be the navigation of the Tagus ;
and, of course, our means of embarkation. However, I have not entirely made up my mind upon this interesting point. I have a great deal of information upon it, but I should wish to have more before I can decide upon it.
< In the mean time, I think that Government should look to sending back at least the coppered transports, as soon as the grand expedition shall have done with them ; and as they receive positive intelligence that Napoleon is reinforcing his armies in Spain : for you may depend upon it, that he and his Marshals must be desirous of revenging upon us the different blows we have given them ; and that when they come into the Peninsula, their first and great object will be to get the English out.
' I think the first part of my letter will give you my opinion respecting one notion you entertained, viz., that the Spaniards might be induced to give the command of their armies to a British Commander in Chief.
f . If such offer should be made to me, I shall decline to accept it till I shall receive His Majesty's pleasure ; and I strongly recommend to you, unless you mean to incur the risk of the loss of your army, not to have any thing to do with Spanish warfare on any ground whatever, in the existing state of things. In respect to Cadiz, the fact is this, that the jealousy of all the Spaniards, even of those most
attached to us, respecting Cadiz, is so rooted, that even if the Government should cede that point (and in their present difficulties I should not be surprised if they were to cede it) to induce me to remain in Spain, I should not think any garrison which this army could spare to be safe in the place.
( If you should take Cadiz you must lay down Portugal, and take up Spain ; you must occupy Cadiz with a garrison of from 1 5,000 to 20,000 men, and you must send from England an army to be employed in the field with the Spa- niards, and make Cadiz your retreat instead of Lisbon.
' You ought, along with Cadiz, to insist upon the command of the armies of Spain. I think you would certainly be able in that case to get away your troops, secure the Spanish ships, &c. &c. &c.
' But you see from the facts in the commencement of this letter, how little prospect you have of bringing the contest to the conclusion for which we all wish.
' I shall be very glad if you will send us the remount horses, and any regiment of dragoons that is to come, as soon as possible ; the best thing to do then, probably, would be to draft the horses of one of the regiments to complete the others, and send that regiment home dismounted. It would be very desirable also to send us 600 or 700 sets of horse appointments.
f Believe me, &c.
' Viscount Castlereagh: ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
To Viscount Castlereagh.
( MY DEAR LORD, ' Badajoz, 21st September, 1 809.
' I have nothing to add to my public letter of this date.
'The 1st dragoons, nearly the whole of the remount for the cavalry, and the recruits for the infantry, are arrived at Lisbon.
' I have ordered the battalions of detachments to Lisbon, having taken from them the men belonging to the regiments of which we have one battalion in this country, and I shall send the remainder to England.
' Believe me, &c.
' Viscount Castlereagh.' ' WELLINGTON.
To the Adjutant General of the Forces.
< SIR, 'Badajoz, 16th November, 1809.
' I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd of October, announcing the arrival of remount horses for the cavalry in this country, and I shall make the best arrangements in my power to have men at Lisbon, belonging to each of the regiments, to take care of the horses on their arrival.
' So large a proportion of the men of the dragoons, however, are now sick, and so many of the horses of each of the regiments are still unfit for service, that I fear that I shall reduce the effective cavalry of the army lower than it ought to be, unless I should retain in Portugal, to take care of those horses on their arrival, a part, at least, of the 23rd dragoons.
' I propose, therefore, to detain a detachment of the 23rd dragoons, from which regiment the horses have been drafted, according to the orders of the Commander in Chief; sending home the greater part of the officers and men of that regi- ment immediately ; and I shall send home the remainder as soon as the other regiments of cavalry shall have so far recovered from the sickness which now prevails in the army, as to enable them, without reducing the numbers of effective cavalry, to take charge of them all.
' I understand from Lieut. General Payne that there are many men in the 23rd dragoons who are desirous of volunteering their services into the other regiments, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know whether the Commander in Chief will permit me to allow them to be transferred to the regiments of cavalry with their own consent.
' Lieut. General Payne has reported to me that all the regiments are in want of horse appointments ; and I beg leave that the Colonels may be directed to send out fifty sets of horse appointments for each of the regiments without loss of time.
* I have the honor to be, &c.
' The Adjutant General ' WELLINGTON.
To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.
1 MY LORD, ' Deleytosa, 10th August, 1809, 6 P.M.
' I have been this day to General Cuesta' s head quarters, at the Mesa de Ibor. The whole of his artillery and wheel carriages had crossed the Ibor; and about one half of the whole appeared to me to have been brought up the mountain on this side of the Ibor at twelve o'clock.
' The enemy's light troops were in Peraleda de Garbin, those of General Cuesta at Bohonal. The enemy has made no movement since yesterday morning.
f The General complained of his distress for provisions, which, indeed, is equally felt by all the troops. The horses of the British cavalry and artillery suffer much from the want of barley. We have lost many hundreds of the former, and above 200 of the latter, by the use of other grains, not having been able to procure barley (the only wholesome food for horses in this country) for the horses of the British cavalry and artillery, notwithstanding that the Spanish cavalry have been plentifully supplied.
' I have also to mention to your Excellency, in order to point out the description of assistance which is given to us in this country, that having applied for a remount of cavalry of only 100 mares, (which cannot be used by the Spanish cavalry, as they ride stallions,) I have not got one, or even an answer from the Government on the subject ; and having asked General Cuesta, after the battle of Talavera, to assist me with 90 mules, to draw the British artillery, in lieu of those lost in the action, he refused to give me any, notwithstanding that there were hundreds in his army employed in drawing carts containing nothing. The consequence is, that I shall now be obliged to send back to Portugal one, if not two, brigades of artillery drawn by bullocks, if I should be able to procure these animals ; if I should not, I must destroy the-
' I have the honor to be, &c.
' Marguis Wellesley. ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Lieut. General
Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.
4 MY DEAR COTTON, ' Cortigo, 20th September, 1810.
' I have given you this day's rest in order that you may distribute the remount horses to the different regiments.
c ' You see that the enemy have all crossed the Mondego, and I propose that you should cross to-morrow, upon which subject Murray writes to you.
' You must take care to cross the Mondego below its junction with the Dao, otherwise you will find it difficult to cross the latter.
' Be so kind as to leave on this side of the Mondego an intelligent officer, either Krauchenberg or Cordemann, or Cocks, with about a squadron, to observe the enemy's movement between the Dao and the Mondego, and do you take care to keep up a communication with him.
' Believe me, &c.
Lieut. General ' WELLINGTON.
To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.
'MY LoRD, 'Cartaxo, 7th December, IS 10.
' I enclose a return of the number of men and horses required to complete the regiments of British cavalry in this country.
' As the appointments of the heavy cavalry are so much more weighty than those of the light dragoons, and the larger horses of the former are with difficulty kept in condition, it would have been desirable to have a larger proportion of the light dragoons, or hussars, with this army : but as the Officers, the men, and their horses, are now accustomed to the food they receive, and to the climate, I do not recommend that the regiments should be changed, or that any additional regiments should be sent out, excepting possibly the remaining two squadrons of the 3d hussars, K.G.L., of which two squadrons are already at Cadiz.
' Your Lordship will observe that nearly 1 000 horses are wanting to complete the several regiments to the number of men they now have, and 1460 to complete to their several establishments.
' I would recommend that no horses should be sent for service to this country which will not be six years old in May ; and that mares should be sent in preference to horses, as it has been found that they bear the work better than the horses.
' I also beg leave to recommend that about 50 or 60 horses or mares of a superior description should be purchased, at the price of 40/. or 50?. each, as a remount for the Officers of the cavalry, who cannot find horses in the Peninsula at present fit for this service, and would pay this price for these horses.
' As great difficulty has been experienced in making shoes and shoe nails for the horses of the cavalry by their farriers, particularly after the cavalry have been actively employed for any length of time, and many horses have been consequently lost, I recommend that 4000 sets of horse shoes, and a double proportion of horse shoe nails, should be sent to the Commissary General for the use of the cavalry,
of the same description with those provided for the horses of the Royal Artillery.
' The regiments to which these shoes would be issued would of course pay for them.
' I have the honor to be, &c.
The Earl of Liverpool.' ' WELLINGTON.
To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.
f MY LORD, ' Cartaxo, 15th December, 1810.
' I enclose a return of horse and infantry transports, and of victuallers, which has been sent to England in consequence of your Lordship's orders of the 24th November.
' I have sent horse transports for about 530 horses, in- cluding the Trafalgar (N.E.), in case your Lordship should think proper to send by this occasion a certain proportion of the remount horses for the cavalry ; and, besides the 2500 tons of infantry transports (including the Meknetho and Langlcy), the Romulus troop ship has been sent.
' I have the honor to be, &c.
' The Earl of Liverpool: ' WELLINGTON.
To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.
< SlR, 'Elvas, 22d May, 1811.
' I have received the directions of the Secretary of State to request that you will send to Cork tonnage to convey to Portugal 200 horses for the Royal Artillery, and likewise tonnage to convey to Portugal the Enniskillen dragoons, consisting of 680 horses ; and that you will send all the remainder of the tonnage for horses, which may be, or may arrive, in the Tagus, to Plymouth, to convey from thence
remount horses for the different services.
' I have the honor to be, &c.
' Vice Admiral ' WELLINGTON.
To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.
' MY DEAR LORD, ' Elvas, 23d May, 1811.
' I have received your letters of the 28th April and 7th May, regarding the remounts for the cavalry ; and I write to Admiral Berkeley to send transports to Cork to bring to Portugal 200 horses of the artillery, and G80 of the Enniskillen dragoons; to send all the other horse transports to Plymouth. I rather believe, however, that all the transports are by this time gone home, and that transports must be
taken from those coming out with the horses to remount the cavalry and artillery, and with the llth light dragoons.
' The enemy's superiority now consists in his cavalry alone and I should entertain no doubt of any of our concerns, if ours were complete : however, that on the frontier of Beira is coming about, and I shall bring the llth dragoons here.
' I think it would be desirable to keep in this country only three squadrons, or six troops of each regiment, and two squadrons, or four troops at home; the home squadrons could then supply the casualties, as well of men as of horses of those abroad ; and we should have at all times an equally
efficient cavalry at a smaller expense. If this arrangement were agreed to I can easily carry it into execution. It must be recollected, however, that the Peninsula is the grave of horses ; I have lost no less than twelve for my own riding since I have been here, and many more of an ordinary kind.
' Believe me, &c.
' The Earl of Liverpool.' < WELLINGTON.
To Lieut. General Sir Stapletnn Cotton, Bart.
' MY DEAR COTTON, ' Freneda, 5th October, 1811.
' Let me know what orders you have given respecting the disposal of the remount horses recently arrived at Lisbon.
' I wish to have the 2d hussars mounted as soon as possible, and that the 3d squadron of the 9th light dragoons should join their corps.
' Believe me, &c.
' Lieut. General 'WELLINGTON.
To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.
' MY DEAR COTTON, ' Freneda, 16th February, 1812, 10 A.M.
' I received yesterday your letter of the 12th. I have no objection to the arrangement which you propose in respect to the horse artillery, if the Captains of the troops of horse artillery have no objection. I am rather inclined to believe, however, that it would be very inconvenient to the horse
artillery to have any persons attached to them who are not mounted.
' You will make your own arrangements on this subject respecting the two troops attached to the cavalry. If you wish to attach dragoons to Ross' troop, or to the troop in
the 7th division, I must give orders about it.
' I have written to England respecting remount horses for the whole cavalry, and have recommended that they should come out at an early period in the season. It would be very desirable that the horse appointments should be at Lisbon, and a sufficient number of the men at least to bring up the horses as they shall arrive.
' I am glad to find you are getting on well with forage. I will speak to the Commissary General about the full ration of corn.
< I have ordered Hervey and Slade to begin their march, to go very slow, and to halt, if possible, every second day ; the 4th dragoon guards not to move. I shall move the 5th dragoon guards soon into the Alentejo, in order to make room for the other troops on their march ; and General Le Marchant's brigade will be the first assembled. The Germans are ordered to Santarem, and will come up to Golegao.
' Believe me, &c.
' Lieut. General ' WELLINGTON.
To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.
< MY LORD, ' Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.
' I think it proper to draw your Lordship's attention at this early period to the state of the cavalry horses in Portugal; and I enclose a paper, containing an account of the number deficient at the present moment, and of the number unserviceable in each regiment. The deficiencies in the 3d dragoon guards are stated to have been occasioned by the want of forty horses to complete it, when that corps was sent from England, and by the loss of a transport, containing twenty six horses, run down by one of His Majesty's ships on the passage ; those in the 14th light dragoons, by the ordinary casualties of the service, and by glanders caught in the transports in which they came from England.
' Your Lordship will observe that the 14th light dragoons have cast no horses for fourteen months, and they have now sixty four horses unserviceable.
' As it is of the utmost importance to keep up the cavalry to its full numbers, and as no horses can be procured in Portugal, I take the liberty of recommending that a remount for each of the regiments, to the amount stated in the enclosed paper, may be sent from England at an early period.
' In case your Lordship should think proper to attend to this recommendation, I further beg leave to recommend that the horses sent may not be those collected at the depots of the regiments respectively, which I understand are generally too young for immediate service ; but horses either drafted or purchased for the purpose, and of the description and in the condition to perform the services which will be immediately required of them.
' I have the honor to be, &c.
' Viscount Castlereagh: ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY
To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of Slate.
' MY DEAR LORD, ' Abrantes, 22d June, 1809.
< When I wrote you last I was in hopes that I should have marched before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The French are continuing their retreat ; Sebastiani has also fallen back towards Toledo ; and Venegas has advanced, and Cuesta had his head quarters at Truxillo on the 19th.
' I am apprehensive that you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily since my arrival upon the Tagus. But it was and is quite impossible to move without money. Not only were the Officers and soldiers in the greatest distress, and the want of money the cause of many of the disorders of which I have had reason to complain ; but we can no longer obtain the supplies of the country, or command its resources for the transport of our own supplies, either by land or by water. Besides this, the army required rest after their expedition to the frontiers of Galicia, and shoes,, and to be furbished up in different ways ; and I was well aware that if necessity had not obliged me to halt at the present , moment, I should have been compelled to have made a longer halt some time hence. To all this add, that, for some time after I came here, I believed the French were retiring (as appears by my letters to your Lordship), and that I should have had no opportunity of striking a blow against them, even if I could have marched.
* I hope that you will attend to my requisitions for money ; not only am I in want, but also the Portuguese Government, to whom, Mr. Villiers says, we owe 125,000/. I repeat that we must have 200,000/. per month from England, till I write to you that I can do without it; in which sum I include 40,000/. per month for the Portuguese Government to pay for 20,000 men.
f If the Portuguese Government are to receive a larger sum from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to pay the Portuguese debts and our debts in Portugal. There are, besides, debts of Sir John Moore's army still due in Spain, which I am called upon to pay. In short, we must have 125,000/. ; and 200,000/. per month, reckoning from the beginning of May.
' It is very extraordinary that I have not received a line from Huskisson upon this subject, notwithstanding that I wrote to him upon it early in May.
f Believe me, &c.
' Viscount Castlereagh. ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
' P. S. I hope you will send the remount horses soon. I have given to the 14th and 16th ninety five horses from the Irish Commissariat, and I believe I shall give some to the other regiments. This arrangement, and the draft from the 3d hussars, will keep up the regiments for a short time. But it is inconceivable how fast both the horses of the cavalry and artillery fall off. When horses, as well as men, are new in war, I believe the former are generally the sacrifice of their mutual inexperience. I hope we shall profit by the experience acquired in the expedition to the northward, and that we shall be able to keep up the regiments rather better in future. ' A. W.'
To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.
' MY DEAR LORD, ' Abrantes, 27th June, 1809.
1 The money for which I have been waiting arrived here on Sunday, and the army has marched forward. Our advanced guard will enter Spain at Zarza la Mayor, on the 2d of July.
' The French retired from Almaraz on the road towards Madrid on the 24th. And General Cuesta was at the bridge of Almaraz on the same day, and was making arrangements to cross the Tagus.
* Sebastiani was retiring towards Toledo. He was on the 22d at Madridejos, and Venegas at Villarta.
' It is unfortunate that I could not march ten or twelve days ago; but just to show you the uncertainty of all communications in this country, and probably the deficiencies ,of our Commissariat, I shall mention that the money which arrived on the 15th at Lisbon, and was sent off' immediately, did not arrive here till late on the 25th. It is the same with everything else. On the day I determined to move into Spain from Abrantes I ordered everything that could be required for the army, and I have not had occasion
-to i add to or to alter the original order ; yet the articles ordered are not yet arrived, notwithstanding that there is a water communication from Lisbon, and Officers and others come up in five days.
' I believe much of this delay and failure is to be attributed to the want of experience of our Commissariat ; much to the want of money, and to our discredit in Portugal, on account of our large and long owed debts ; and something to the uncertainty and natural difficulties of all the com-munications in Portugal.
' We shall not go into Spain quite so strong as I could wish ; but when Craufurd's brigade arrives I think we shall have nearly 20,000 rank and file of infantry, and about 3000 cavalry. I shall desire that a weekly state may be sent to your Lordship, that you may see how we really stand; for I observe it is frequently imagined in England that armies are much stronger than they really are, and expectations are formed which cannot be realized. It is a most difficult task to keep up numbers, particularly of cavalry, in this country and climate. The brigade of heavy cavalry, which has not yet done a day's duty, is obliged to leave here nearly 100 horses ; and the brigade which has been to the northward is so much reduced, that they are happy to take 110 horses of the Irish Commissariat. I hope, therefore, you will send us the remount as soon as you can.
' Believe me, &c.
' Viscount Castlereagh.' ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY,
To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.
' SIR, ' Jaraicejo, 13th August, 1809.
( I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the llth.
' The plan which your Excellency proposes of placing all the supplies in a magazine, to be formed at Truxillo, and to divide them between the two armies in proportion to the strength of each, would answer perfectly if it were practicable. But your Excellency must be aware that many articles of provisions are received by your Excellency's army which do not pass through Truxillo, and could not be brought there without great inconvenience and delay, and could never appear in the accounts of the magazines ; and that other supplies could easily be turned oiF from Truxilio without my having any knowledge of the fact.
' The British army receive no provisions of which Sr. Lozano de Torres has not a knowledge ; and your Excellency has it in your power to give him such orders as you may think proper, both as to the formation of the magazine, and the share which the British troops shall have of it.
< When the British army entered Spain I had reason to expect, and I expected, that a great effort would be made to afford us subsistence, at least for payment, and those means of transport and other aids, without which your Excellency is well aware no army can keep the field.
' Your Excellency also knows how these expectations have been fulfilled. Since I joined your army the troops have not received, upon an average, half a ration, and on some days nothing at all; and the cavalry no forage or grain, excepting what they could pick up in the fields, of an unwholesome description, by the use of which hundreds of horses have died.
' I can procure no means of transport, and your Excellency knows that I have been obliged to leave some ammunition in the mountains, of which you have possession ; and if I now move, I must leave behind me two thirds of the small quantity of ammunition I have got, having been obliged to allot the Portuguese carts, which have moved it hitherto, to the purpose of removing the wounded soldiers.
' The fire of the enemy, and the badness and scarcity of food, have destroyed many of my artillery horses ; and I have asked, but in vain, for some assistance of this description. The consequence is that I shall be obliged to destroy many guns when I shall move from hence.
< I have not received even an answer to the request I made to have a remount for the cavalry of only 100 mares, which would be entirely useless to the Spanish cavalry.
' Under all these circumstances, your Excellency cannot be surprised that I should think that the British army has been neglected and ill treated ; or at the determination which I now communicate to you, that whatever maybe the consequences to the valuable interests to which you refer in your letter, I shall march them back into Portugal, if they are not more regularly and more plentifully supplied with pro-
visions and forage, and with the means of transport, and other aids which they require.
' I have to observe, that whether I put this determination into execution or not, the evil consequences that you apprehend to the valuable interests to which you refer, must equally follow ; as the army will be unable and unfit to perform any operation, if the privations which it has suffered are still to continue.
' I request your Excellency to give orders to the troops you have sent to Truxillo not to prevent the officers and soldiers of the British army from buying what they want there. The troops have had no salt or other necessary articles for some time, and it is desirable that they and their officers should be allowed to buy at Truxillo what that place can afford.
' I have the honor to be, &c.
' Captain General < ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUT. COLONEL WATERS.
* Jaraicejo, 14th August, 1809.
' 1. The number of rations required daily by the British army is now 25,000 for men, and 6000 for horses, &c.
( 2. It appears to me that it will be difficult to settle any plan by which the contents of any magazine could be issued to the two armies in proportion to their numbers, because both armies may, and the Spanish army certainly does, draw provisions and forage from some quarters besides the maga-
zine which is formed at Truxillo. The British army now get their bread only from Truxillo ; therefore, any arrangement which should throw all the bread baked at, or which, may be brought to Truxillo, into a magazine to be divided in proportions between the two armies, would be unjust towards the British, and would probably starve it.
' 3. If, however, any arrangement can be adopted by which this difficulty can be got over, I shall have no objection to it in respect to bread; and no objection whatever in respect to barley.
1 4. In respect to meat, as that is to be got in all parts of the country, it would be best to leave the supply as it is, in the hands of the Commissaries of the different nations.
' 5. At least 1000 beasts of burthen are required for the British army.
' 6. 100 carts, each to carry 600 Ibs., are required to carry the ammunition left at Deleytosa.
' 7. 100 good draught mules or horses are required to draw the British artillery.
' 8. 300 mares are required to remount the British cavalry.
' 9. Payment will be made on the spot for such of these animals as shall be purchased, and the regular and usual hire paid for those which shall be hired.
' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'
To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.
< MY DEAR LORD, . Merida, 25th August, 1809. '
' I received by Mr. Hay, on the day before yesterday, your letter of the 4th August, and having for some time past turned my mind very seriously to the consideration of the points to which it relates, I am not unprepared to give you an opinion upon them.
1 The information which I have acquired in the last two months has opened my eyes respecting the state of the war in the Peninsula ; and I shall just state a few facts which will enable the King's ministers to form their own opinions upon it.
' I calculate the French force in the Peninsula now to consist of about 125,000 men : of this number, about 70,000 are in this part of Spain ; St. Cyr's corps, about 20,000 men, are engaged in the siege of Gerona ; Suchet's, about 14,000, in Aragon; and the remainder are employed in different garrisons, such as Avila, &c., and in keeping up the communication with France: all of which, if necessary, are disposable for the field. These 125,000 men are exclusive of the garrisons of Pamplona, Barcelona, &c. &c.
c These troops, you will observe, are all in Spain ; and against this force the Spaniards have, under Venegas and Eguia, late Cuesta's army, about 50,000 men ; Romana, the Duque del Parque, and every thing to the northward, about 25,000 ; Blake may have gotten together again about 5000 or 6000 ; and I believe there is nothing in Aragon and Catalonia, excepting an armed population.
f Thus, 'the Spaniards have not, at the end of eighteen months nearly, after the commencement of the revolution, above 80,000 men, of which the composition and quality will be found still more defective than the numbers are deficient to carry on the contest with the French even in their present strength.
' To these numbers add all the troops we can bring into the field at present, which are about 25,000 men, and about 10,000 Portuguese, and you will see that the allies are at this moment inferior in point of numbers only to the enemy in the Peninsula. However, in this account of the troops of the allies, Ido not reckon many garrisons and towns occupied by both Spaniards and Portuguese ; nor do I reckon the French garrisons. I count only those men on both sides who can be brought into the field to fight.
' In respect to the composition of these armies, we find the French well supplied with troops of the different descriptions and arms required : viz., infantry, artillery, and cavalry, heavy and light.
* Cuesta's army had about 7000 cavalry, Venegas' about 3000, and there may be about 2000 more cavalry distributed throughout Spain,
1 The English have about 2500 cavalry left, and the Portuguese army may have 500 or 600. Probably, if all this cavalry were efficient, and could be divided as it ought to be, it might be sufficient, and might be found more numerous than that of the French in the Peninsula : but you will observe that all the cavalry is now in the south, and Romana's army (which it is most important to bring forward, as unless
it is brought forward the allies can never make any impression on the French to the southward) has neither cavalry nor artillery, and cannot quit the mountains; neither has the Duque del Parque more than one regiment, or Blake more than the same number.
' I come now to the description of the troops, and here I am sorry to say that our allies fail us still more than they do in numbers and composition.
* The Spanish cavalry are, I believe, nearly entirely with out discipline. They are in general well clothed, armed, and accoutred, and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good condition ; I mean those of Eguia's army, which I have seen. But I have never heard any body pretend that in any one instance they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in presence of an enemy. They make no scruple of running off, and after an action are to be found in every village, and every shady bottom within fifty miles of the field of battle.
' The Spanish artillery are, as far as I have seen of them, entirely unexceptionable, and the Portuguese artillery excellent.
' In respect to the great body of all armies, I mean the infantry, it is lamentable to see how bad that of the Spaniards is, and how unequal to a contest with the French. They are armed, I believe, well ; they are badly accoutred, not having the means of saving their ammunition from the rain ; not clothed in some instances at all, in others clothed in such a manner as to make them look like peasants, which
ought of all things to be avoided ; and their discipline appears to me to be confined to placing them in the ranks, three deep at very close order, and to the manual exercise.
( It is impossible to calculate upon any operation with these troops. It is said that sometimes they behave well ; though I acknowledge that I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill. Bassecourt's corps, which was supposed to be the best in Cuesta s army, and was engaged on our left in the mountains, at the battle of Talavera, was kept in check throughout the day by one French battalion : this corps has since run away from the bridge of Arzobispo, leaving its guns ; and many of the men,, according to the usual Spanish custom, throwing away their arms, accoutrements, and clothing. It is a curious circumstance respecting this affair at Arzobispo, (in which Soult writes that the French took thirty pieces of cannon,) that the Spaniards ran off in such a hurry, that they left their cannon loaded and unspiked; and that the French, although they drove the Spaniards from the bridge, did not think themselves strong enough to push after them ; and Colonel Waters, whom I sent in with a flag of truce on the 10th, relating to our wounded, found the cannon on the road, abandoned by the one party, and not taken possession of, and probably not known of, by the other.
' This practice of running away, and throwing off arms, accoutrements, and clothing, is fatal to every thing, excepting a re-assembly of the men in a state of nature, who as regularly perform the same manoeuvre the next time an occasion offers. Nearly 2000 ran off on the evening of the 27th from the battle of Talavera, (not 100 yards from the place where I was standing,) who were neither attacked, nor threatened with an attack, and who were frightened only by the noise of their own fire : they left their arms and accoutrements on the ground, their officers went with them; and they, and the fugitive cavalry, plundered the baggage of the British army which had been sent to the rear. Many others went whom I did not see.
' Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army ; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has, by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should be so little understood. They are really children in the art of war, and I cannot say that they do any thing as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state of nature.
' I really believe that much of this deficiency of numbers, composition, discipline, and efficiency, is to be attributed to the existing government of Spain. They have attempted to govern the kingdom in a state of revolution, by an adherence to old rules and systems, and with the aid of what is called enthusiasm ; and this last is, in fact, no aid to accomplish any thing, and is only an excuse for the irregularity with which every thing is done, and for the want of discipline and subordination of the armies.
' People are very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French through their revolution, and was the parent of those exertions which have nearly conquered the world ; but if the subject is nicely examined, it will be found that enthusiasm was the name only, but that force was the instrument which brought forward those great resources under the system of terror which first stopped the allies ; and that a perseverance in the same system of applying every individual and every description of property to the servjce of the army, by force, has since conquered Europe.
' After this statement, you will judge for yourselves, whether you will employ any, and what strength of army in support of the cause in Spain.
' Circumstances with which you are acquainted have obliged me to separate myself from the Spanish army, and I can only tell you that I feel no inclination to join in co-operation with them again, upon my own responsibility : and that I shall see my way very clearly before me indeed, before I do so ; and I do not recommend you to have any thing to do with them in their present state.
' Before I quit this part of the subject, it may be satisfactory to you to know that I do not think matters would have been much better if you had sent your large expedition to Spain, instead of to the Scheldt. You could not have equipped it in Galicia, or any where in the north of Spain.
< If we had had 60,000 men instead of 20,000, in all probability we should not have got to Talavera to fight the battle, for want of means and provisions. But if we had got to Talavera, we could not have gone farther, and the armies would probably have separated for want of means of subsistence, probably without a battle ; but certainly afterwards.
' Besides, you will observe that your 40,000 men, supposing them to be equipped and means to exist of feeding them, would not compensate for the deficiency of numbers, of composition, and of efficiency in the Spanish armies ; and that supposing they had been able to remove the French from Madrid,they could not have removed them from the Peninsula, even in the existing state of the French force.
' I now come to another branch of the subject, which is Portugal itself. I have not got from Beresford his report upon the present, and the probable future state of the Portuguese army ; and therefore I should wish to be understood as writing, upon this part of the subject, liable to corrections from him.
' My opinion is, and always has been, that the mode of applying the services of the English officers to the Portuguese army has been erroneous. I think that Beresford ought to have had the temporary assistance of the ablest officers the British service could afford; that these officers ought not to have been posted to regiments in the Portuguese army, but under the title of Adjutants to the Field Marshal, or any other, they ought to have superintended discipline, military movements, and arrangements of all descriptions, wherever they might be : fewer officers would then have answered his purpose, and every one given to him would have been useful ; whereas many (all in the inferior ranks) are, under existing arrangements, useless.
' Besides this, the selection of officers sent out to Portugal for this service has been unlucky, and the decision on the questions which I sent to England on the 7th of June, has been made without reference to circumstances, or to the feelings or opinions of the individuals on whom it was to operate; and just like every other decision I have ever seen from the same quarter, as if men were stocks and
stones.
( To this, add that rank (Portuguese rank, I mean) has been given in the most capricious manner. In some instances, a man not in the army at all is made a Brigadier General ; in others, another who was the senior of the Brigadier General when both were in the army, is a Lieut. Colonel; then a junior Lieut. Colonel is made a Brigadier General, his senior a Colonel, and his senior a junior Colonel ; and thereare instances of juniors being preferred to seniors in every rank ; in short, the Prince Regent of Portugal is a despotic prince, and his commissions have been given to British Officers and subjects in the most arbitrary manner at the Horse Guards ; and the answer to all these complaints at the Horse Guards must be uniform, nobody has any right to complain ; the Prince Kegent has a right to
give to any body any commission he pleases, bearing any date he chooses to assign to it. The officers of this army have to a man quitted the Portuguese service, as I said they would, and there is not an officer who has joined it from England who would not quit it if we would allow him ; but here we keep them : so much for that arrangement.
' The subject upon which particularly I wished Beresford to report, was the state of the Portuguese army in respect to its numbers. The troops have lately deserted to an alarming degree ; and, in fact, none of the regiments are complete. The Portuguese army is recruited by conscription constitutionally, very much in the same manner with the French army ; but then it must be recollected, that, for the last fifty years nearly, the troops have never left their province, and scarcely ever their native town ; and their discipline, and the labors and exertion required from them, were nothing.
' Things are much altered lately, and notwithstanding that the pay has been increased, I fear that the animal is not of the description to bear up against what is required of him ; and he deserts most terribly.
' The military forces stationed in the provinces enabled the civil government to carry into execution the conscription ; but under present circumstances, the military force is upon principle, as well as necessity, removed to a distance. The civil government has been so frequently overthrown in all parts of Portugal, that it can hardly be said to exist ; and there is another circumstance which I am afraid cramps its operations, particularly those operations which are to put a restraint upon the people, and that is, that they are all armed, and they defy the civil magistrate and the government who order them to march as conscripts, whose authority is unsupported by a sufficient military force : I am therefore very apprehensive that Beresford will find it impossible to fill his ranks : however, as I said before, I should wish Government to delay making their minds up on this part of the subject till I shall be enabled to send them Beresford's report, for which I have called.
' The next point in this subject is, supposing the Portuguese army to be rendered efficient, what can be done with it and Portugal, if the French should obtain possession of the remainder of the Peninsula ? My opinion is, that we ought to be able to hold Portugal, if the Portuguese army and militia are complete.
* The difficulty upon this sole question lies in the embarkation of the British army. There are so many entrances into Portugal, the whole country being frontier, that it would be very difficult to prevent the enemy from penetrating; and it is probable that we should be obliged to confine ourselves to the preservation of that which is most important the capital.
< It is difficult, if not impossible,-to bring the contest for the capital to extremities, and afterwards to embark the British army. You will see what I mean, by a reference to the map. Lisbon is so high up the Tagus that no army that we could collect would be able at the same time to secure the navigation of the river by the occupation of both banks, and the possession of the capital. One of the objects must, I fear, be given up, and that which the Portuguese would give up would be the navigation of the Tagus ;
and, of course, our means of embarkation. However, I have not entirely made up my mind upon this interesting point. I have a great deal of information upon it, but I should wish to have more before I can decide upon it.
< In the mean time, I think that Government should look to sending back at least the coppered transports, as soon as the grand expedition shall have done with them ; and as they receive positive intelligence that Napoleon is reinforcing his armies in Spain : for you may depend upon it, that he and his Marshals must be desirous of revenging upon us the different blows we have given them ; and that when they come into the Peninsula, their first and great object will be to get the English out.
' I think the first part of my letter will give you my opinion respecting one notion you entertained, viz., that the Spaniards might be induced to give the command of their armies to a British Commander in Chief.
f . If such offer should be made to me, I shall decline to accept it till I shall receive His Majesty's pleasure ; and I strongly recommend to you, unless you mean to incur the risk of the loss of your army, not to have any thing to do with Spanish warfare on any ground whatever, in the existing state of things. In respect to Cadiz, the fact is this, that the jealousy of all the Spaniards, even of those most
attached to us, respecting Cadiz, is so rooted, that even if the Government should cede that point (and in their present difficulties I should not be surprised if they were to cede it) to induce me to remain in Spain, I should not think any garrison which this army could spare to be safe in the place.
( If you should take Cadiz you must lay down Portugal, and take up Spain ; you must occupy Cadiz with a garrison of from 1 5,000 to 20,000 men, and you must send from England an army to be employed in the field with the Spa- niards, and make Cadiz your retreat instead of Lisbon.
' You ought, along with Cadiz, to insist upon the command of the armies of Spain. I think you would certainly be able in that case to get away your troops, secure the Spanish ships, &c. &c. &c.
' But you see from the facts in the commencement of this letter, how little prospect you have of bringing the contest to the conclusion for which we all wish.
' I shall be very glad if you will send us the remount horses, and any regiment of dragoons that is to come, as soon as possible ; the best thing to do then, probably, would be to draft the horses of one of the regiments to complete the others, and send that regiment home dismounted. It would be very desirable also to send us 600 or 700 sets of horse appointments.
f Believe me, &c.
' Viscount Castlereagh: ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
To Viscount Castlereagh.
( MY DEAR LORD, ' Badajoz, 21st September, 1 809.
' I have nothing to add to my public letter of this date.
'The 1st dragoons, nearly the whole of the remount for the cavalry, and the recruits for the infantry, are arrived at Lisbon.
' I have ordered the battalions of detachments to Lisbon, having taken from them the men belonging to the regiments of which we have one battalion in this country, and I shall send the remainder to England.
' Believe me, &c.
' Viscount Castlereagh.' ' WELLINGTON.
To the Adjutant General of the Forces.
< SIR, 'Badajoz, 16th November, 1809.
' I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd of October, announcing the arrival of remount horses for the cavalry in this country, and I shall make the best arrangements in my power to have men at Lisbon, belonging to each of the regiments, to take care of the horses on their arrival.
' So large a proportion of the men of the dragoons, however, are now sick, and so many of the horses of each of the regiments are still unfit for service, that I fear that I shall reduce the effective cavalry of the army lower than it ought to be, unless I should retain in Portugal, to take care of those horses on their arrival, a part, at least, of the 23rd dragoons.
' I propose, therefore, to detain a detachment of the 23rd dragoons, from which regiment the horses have been drafted, according to the orders of the Commander in Chief; sending home the greater part of the officers and men of that regi- ment immediately ; and I shall send home the remainder as soon as the other regiments of cavalry shall have so far recovered from the sickness which now prevails in the army, as to enable them, without reducing the numbers of effective cavalry, to take charge of them all.
' I understand from Lieut. General Payne that there are many men in the 23rd dragoons who are desirous of volunteering their services into the other regiments, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know whether the Commander in Chief will permit me to allow them to be transferred to the regiments of cavalry with their own consent.
' Lieut. General Payne has reported to me that all the regiments are in want of horse appointments ; and I beg leave that the Colonels may be directed to send out fifty sets of horse appointments for each of the regiments without loss of time.
* I have the honor to be, &c.
' The Adjutant General ' WELLINGTON.
To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.
1 MY LORD, ' Deleytosa, 10th August, 1809, 6 P.M.
' I have been this day to General Cuesta' s head quarters, at the Mesa de Ibor. The whole of his artillery and wheel carriages had crossed the Ibor; and about one half of the whole appeared to me to have been brought up the mountain on this side of the Ibor at twelve o'clock.
' The enemy's light troops were in Peraleda de Garbin, those of General Cuesta at Bohonal. The enemy has made no movement since yesterday morning.
f The General complained of his distress for provisions, which, indeed, is equally felt by all the troops. The horses of the British cavalry and artillery suffer much from the want of barley. We have lost many hundreds of the former, and above 200 of the latter, by the use of other grains, not having been able to procure barley (the only wholesome food for horses in this country) for the horses of the British cavalry and artillery, notwithstanding that the Spanish cavalry have been plentifully supplied.
' I have also to mention to your Excellency, in order to point out the description of assistance which is given to us in this country, that having applied for a remount of cavalry of only 100 mares, (which cannot be used by the Spanish cavalry, as they ride stallions,) I have not got one, or even an answer from the Government on the subject ; and having asked General Cuesta, after the battle of Talavera, to assist me with 90 mules, to draw the British artillery, in lieu of those lost in the action, he refused to give me any, notwithstanding that there were hundreds in his army employed in drawing carts containing nothing. The consequence is, that I shall now be obliged to send back to Portugal one, if not two, brigades of artillery drawn by bullocks, if I should be able to procure these animals ; if I should not, I must destroy the-
' I have the honor to be, &c.
' Marguis Wellesley. ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Lieut. General
Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.
4 MY DEAR COTTON, ' Cortigo, 20th September, 1810.
' I have given you this day's rest in order that you may distribute the remount horses to the different regiments.
c ' You see that the enemy have all crossed the Mondego, and I propose that you should cross to-morrow, upon which subject Murray writes to you.
' You must take care to cross the Mondego below its junction with the Dao, otherwise you will find it difficult to cross the latter.
' Be so kind as to leave on this side of the Mondego an intelligent officer, either Krauchenberg or Cordemann, or Cocks, with about a squadron, to observe the enemy's movement between the Dao and the Mondego, and do you take care to keep up a communication with him.
' Believe me, &c.
Lieut. General ' WELLINGTON.
To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.
'MY LoRD, 'Cartaxo, 7th December, IS 10.
' I enclose a return of the number of men and horses required to complete the regiments of British cavalry in this country.
' As the appointments of the heavy cavalry are so much more weighty than those of the light dragoons, and the larger horses of the former are with difficulty kept in condition, it would have been desirable to have a larger proportion of the light dragoons, or hussars, with this army : but as the Officers, the men, and their horses, are now accustomed to the food they receive, and to the climate, I do not recommend that the regiments should be changed, or that any additional regiments should be sent out, excepting possibly the remaining two squadrons of the 3d hussars, K.G.L., of which two squadrons are already at Cadiz.
' Your Lordship will observe that nearly 1 000 horses are wanting to complete the several regiments to the number of men they now have, and 1460 to complete to their several establishments.
' I would recommend that no horses should be sent for service to this country which will not be six years old in May ; and that mares should be sent in preference to horses, as it has been found that they bear the work better than the horses.
' I also beg leave to recommend that about 50 or 60 horses or mares of a superior description should be purchased, at the price of 40/. or 50?. each, as a remount for the Officers of the cavalry, who cannot find horses in the Peninsula at present fit for this service, and would pay this price for these horses.
' As great difficulty has been experienced in making shoes and shoe nails for the horses of the cavalry by their farriers, particularly after the cavalry have been actively employed for any length of time, and many horses have been consequently lost, I recommend that 4000 sets of horse shoes, and a double proportion of horse shoe nails, should be sent to the Commissary General for the use of the cavalry,
of the same description with those provided for the horses of the Royal Artillery.
' The regiments to which these shoes would be issued would of course pay for them.
' I have the honor to be, &c.
The Earl of Liverpool.' ' WELLINGTON.
To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.
f MY LORD, ' Cartaxo, 15th December, 1810.
' I enclose a return of horse and infantry transports, and of victuallers, which has been sent to England in consequence of your Lordship's orders of the 24th November.
' I have sent horse transports for about 530 horses, in- cluding the Trafalgar (N.E.), in case your Lordship should think proper to send by this occasion a certain proportion of the remount horses for the cavalry ; and, besides the 2500 tons of infantry transports (including the Meknetho and Langlcy), the Romulus troop ship has been sent.
' I have the honor to be, &c.
' The Earl of Liverpool: ' WELLINGTON.
To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.
< SlR, 'Elvas, 22d May, 1811.
' I have received the directions of the Secretary of State to request that you will send to Cork tonnage to convey to Portugal 200 horses for the Royal Artillery, and likewise tonnage to convey to Portugal the Enniskillen dragoons, consisting of 680 horses ; and that you will send all the remainder of the tonnage for horses, which may be, or may arrive, in the Tagus, to Plymouth, to convey from thence
remount horses for the different services.
' I have the honor to be, &c.
' Vice Admiral ' WELLINGTON.
To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.
' MY DEAR LORD, ' Elvas, 23d May, 1811.
' I have received your letters of the 28th April and 7th May, regarding the remounts for the cavalry ; and I write to Admiral Berkeley to send transports to Cork to bring to Portugal 200 horses of the artillery, and G80 of the Enniskillen dragoons; to send all the other horse transports to Plymouth. I rather believe, however, that all the transports are by this time gone home, and that transports must be
taken from those coming out with the horses to remount the cavalry and artillery, and with the llth light dragoons.
' The enemy's superiority now consists in his cavalry alone and I should entertain no doubt of any of our concerns, if ours were complete : however, that on the frontier of Beira is coming about, and I shall bring the llth dragoons here.
' I think it would be desirable to keep in this country only three squadrons, or six troops of each regiment, and two squadrons, or four troops at home; the home squadrons could then supply the casualties, as well of men as of horses of those abroad ; and we should have at all times an equally
efficient cavalry at a smaller expense. If this arrangement were agreed to I can easily carry it into execution. It must be recollected, however, that the Peninsula is the grave of horses ; I have lost no less than twelve for my own riding since I have been here, and many more of an ordinary kind.
' Believe me, &c.
' The Earl of Liverpool.' < WELLINGTON.
To Lieut. General Sir Stapletnn Cotton, Bart.
' MY DEAR COTTON, ' Freneda, 5th October, 1811.
' Let me know what orders you have given respecting the disposal of the remount horses recently arrived at Lisbon.
' I wish to have the 2d hussars mounted as soon as possible, and that the 3d squadron of the 9th light dragoons should join their corps.
' Believe me, &c.
' Lieut. General 'WELLINGTON.
To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.
' MY DEAR COTTON, ' Freneda, 16th February, 1812, 10 A.M.
' I received yesterday your letter of the 12th. I have no objection to the arrangement which you propose in respect to the horse artillery, if the Captains of the troops of horse artillery have no objection. I am rather inclined to believe, however, that it would be very inconvenient to the horse
artillery to have any persons attached to them who are not mounted.
' You will make your own arrangements on this subject respecting the two troops attached to the cavalry. If you wish to attach dragoons to Ross' troop, or to the troop in
the 7th division, I must give orders about it.
' I have written to England respecting remount horses for the whole cavalry, and have recommended that they should come out at an early period in the season. It would be very desirable that the horse appointments should be at Lisbon, and a sufficient number of the men at least to bring up the horses as they shall arrive.
' I am glad to find you are getting on well with forage. I will speak to the Commissary General about the full ration of corn.
< I have ordered Hervey and Slade to begin their march, to go very slow, and to halt, if possible, every second day ; the 4th dragoon guards not to move. I shall move the 5th dragoon guards soon into the Alentejo, in order to make room for the other troops on their march ; and General Le Marchant's brigade will be the first assembled. The Germans are ordered to Santarem, and will come up to Golegao.
' Believe me, &c.
' Lieut. General ' WELLINGTON.
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